Revisiting "Reconsidering Jewish-Christian Relations" by Andrew Jacobs
Jacobs	  |	  "Revisiting	  Reconsidering"	  |	  p.	  1	  
Revisiting	  Reconsidering	  "Jewish-­‐Christian	  Relations":	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  Theory,	  
History,	  and	  Antiquity	  
Andrew	  S.	  Jacobs	  
Scripps	  College,	  Claremont,	  CA	  
ajacobs@scrippscollege.edu	  
March	  7,	  2013	  
	  
	   Ten	  years	  ago,	  I	  attempted	  to	  untangle	  the	  Gordian	  knot	  of	  "Jewish-­‐Christian	  
relations"	  in	  antiquity.1	  The	  problem	  was,	  in	  a	  very	  practical	  sense,	  one	  of	  sources:	  we	  have	  
loads	  of	  Christian	  writings	  about	  Jews	  but	  very	  few	  Jewish	  writings	  by	  contrast.	  What's	  
more,	  the	  Christian	  sources	  were	  almost	  uniformly	  hostile,	  depicting	  Jews	  as	  sinister,	  
maleficent,	  and	  at	  times	  even	  brutal	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  Christianity.	  Christian	  sources	  
claimed	  constant,	  and	  vituperative,	  contact	  between	  Jews	  and	  Christians	  from	  the	  time	  of	  
Jesus	  onward.	  These	  Christian	  sources	  were	  also,	  obviously,	  rhetorical	  and	  overdetermined	  
in	  their	  efforts	  to	  vilify	  Jews.	  Yet,	  from	  the	  Jewish	  side,	  relative	  quiet.	  
	   Earlier	  generations	  of	  scholars	  emphasized	  the	  rhetorical	  nature	  of	  these	  texts:	  the	  
Jews	  encountered	  there	  were	  mere	  ciphers,	  shadows	  that	  Christians	  used	  to	  defend	  
themselves	  to	  pagan	  society.	  The	  violent	  excesses	  and	  horrors	  of	  the	  second	  World	  War	  
made	  Christian	  scholars	  leery	  of	  too	  rapidly	  erasing	  the	  vitality	  and	  agency	  of	  Jews	  in	  
antiquity,	  so	  these	  texts	  were	  taken	  more	  seriously	  as	  historical	  records	  of	  conflict.	  The	  
phantom	  Jews	  of	  earlier	  scholarship	  were	  given	  flesh	  and	  life.	  Of	  course,	  taking	  seriously	  
the	  conflict	  narratives	  of	  Christian	  texts	  also	  meant	  taking	  seriously	  Christian	  accounts	  of	  
Jewish	  villainy:	  Jews	  calling	  for	  the	  blood	  of	  Christians	  martyrs,	  stoning	  Christian	  saints,	  
throwing	  open	  the	  gates	  of	  Jerusalem	  to	  Persian	  invaders	  and	  buying	  up	  Christian	  slaves	  to	  
kill.	  	  
	   By	  the	  time	  I	  was	  writing	  my	  dissertation	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  on	  Christian	  writings	  
about	  Jews	  from	  the	  late	  ancient	  holy	  land,	  possibilities	  of	  historical	  recovery	  had	  become	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hopelessly	  entangled	  with	  issues	  of	  historiographic	  ethics.	  To	  recover	  "real"	  Jewish-­‐
Christian	  relations	  from	  our	  Christian	  sources	  was	  to	  endorse	  (in	  some	  measure)	  the	  
appalling	  portrayal	  of	  Jews	  in	  Christian	  texts.	  To	  reject	  these	  portrayals	  as	  mere	  "rhetoric"	  
invented	  out	  of	  whole	  cloth	  was	  (possibly)	  to	  admit	  that	  historical	  Jewish-­‐Christian	  
relations	  (and	  possibly	  historical	  Jews,	  as	  well)	  were	  lost	  to	  us.	  Jews	  either	  vanish	  from	  
Christian	  history	  or	  remain	  fixed	  there	  with	  blood	  on	  their	  hands	  and	  murder	  in	  their	  
hearts.	  
	   The	  choice	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  reality	  seemed	  to	  me,	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  ago,	  
both	  historically	  and	  ethically	  untenable,	  a	  false	  choice	  that	  viewed	  our	  ancient	  sources	  in	  
too	  flat	  a	  manner,	  as	  either	  empty	  fantasies	  or	  reliable	  sources.	  My	  response	  was	  to	  
approach	  the	  question	  from	  a	  different	  theoretical	  perspective,	  one	  that	  would	  allow	  me	  to	  
appreciate	  my	  sources	  as	  both	  historically	  valuable	  and	  rhetorically	  unreliable.	  In	  
surveying	  centuries	  of	  Christian	  texts	  about	  Jews	  I	  approached	  them	  from	  the	  vantage	  
point	  of	  postcolonial	  studies.	  	  
	   As	  I	  defined	  this	  perspective	  in	  2003,	  "postcolonial	  criticism	  is	  a	  distinct	  set	  of	  
reading	  practices	  that	  seeks	  to	  uncover	  the	  cultural	  processes	  of	  domination	  and	  
appropriation	  that	  are	  intimately	  interwoven	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  empire."2	  Following	  
theorists	  such	  as	  Edward	  Said,	  Homi	  Bhabha,	  and	  Gayatri	  Spivak,	  I	  read	  Christian	  texts	  of	  
empire	  against	  their	  grain,	  as	  rhetorical	  artifacts	  that	  could	  nonetheless	  powerfully	  shape	  
reality	  and	  engender	  processes	  of	  cultural	  domination	  and	  resistance.	  I	  was,	  self-­‐
consciously,	  importing	  a	  strictly	  modern	  form	  of	  cultural,	  political,	  and	  literary	  analysis—
one	  formed	  in	  the	  nexus	  of	  modern	  ideas	  about	  race,	  capital,	  and	  gender—into	  the	  ancient	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world,	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  some	  of	  its	  most	  prominent	  theorists.3	  Nonetheless,	  devising	  a	  
theoretical	  approach	  made	  sense	  to	  me,	  and	  foregrounding	  that	  theory	  also	  made	  sense.	  
	   Of	  course	  (as	  I	  tell	  my	  students)	  when	  something	  "makes	  sense"	  we	  must	  step	  back	  
and	  question	  it.	  Why	  should	  theory	  become	  so	  prominent	  in	  my	  first	  book	  (and	  I	  think	  
some	  would	  say	  even	  more	  so	  in	  my	  second	  book)?	  Why	  should	  I	  turn	  to	  "critical	  theory"	  
(of	  which	  postcolonial	  criticism	  is	  but	  one	  species)	  for	  historical	  answers,	  and	  why	  should	  I	  
(as	  it	  seemed	  to	  some	  readers)	  make	  such	  a	  big	  deal	  out	  of	  it?	  
	   What	  I'd	  like	  to	  do	  today	  is	  revisit	  my	  biographical	  and	  historiographic	  
circumstances	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennia	  in	  order	  to	  interrogate	  my	  own	  theoretical	  
suppositions	  and	  assumptions	  and	  (I	  hope)	  raise	  larger	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  theory	  
in	  ancient	  history.	  I	  take	  myself	  as	  a	  test	  case:	  how	  did	  I	  arrive	  at	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  
theoretical	  "common	  sense"?	  Does	  theory	  do	  what	  I	  think	  it	  does?	  And	  what,	  exactly,	  do	  I	  
think	  I—and	  it—are	  doing?	  
	  
Biography	  
	   I	  had	  very	  little	  theoretical	  formation	  as	  an	  undergraduate:	  although	  it	  sounds	  
strange	  to	  say	  it,	  I	  don't	  think	  I'd	  read	  a	  word	  of	  Michel	  Foucault	  before	  beginning	  graduate	  
school.	  But	  studying	  religion	  at	  Duke	  University,	  particularly	  under	  the	  august	  auspices	  of	  
Elizabeth	  Clark	  and	  Dale	  Martin	  in	  the	  1990s,	  was	  to	  arrive	  in	  a	  place	  dripping	  with	  
"theory."	  Clark	  had	  recently	  published	  her	  book	  on	  the	  Origenist	  controversy	  and	  Martin	  
had	  just	  finished	  The	  Corinthian	  Body:	  both	  volumes	  made	  explicit	  the	  theoretical	  
perspectives	  and	  commitments	  of	  their	  authors	  and	  both	  served	  as	  models	  of	  good	  
scholarship	  for	  their	  students.4	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   The	  curriculum	  was	  not	  itself	  particularly	  "theorized."	  I	  took	  one	  course	  on	  
hermeneutics	  with	  Martin,	  a	  course	  designed	  for	  New	  Testament	  students,	  in	  which	  we	  
read	  lots	  of	  continental	  philosophy	  of	  "meaning"	  along	  with	  a	  smattering	  of	  French	  
structuralism	  and	  poststructuralism.	  The	  Graduate	  Program	  in	  Religion	  at	  Duke	  University	  
didn't	  require	  any	  method	  and	  theory	  class	  of	  its	  graduate	  students—a	  policy,	  I	  learned,	  
that	  was	  a	  subject	  of	  vociferous	  debate	  among	  the	  faculty	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s—
although	  we	  were	  able	  to	  take	  such	  a	  class	  if	  we	  wanted.5	  Theory	  was,	  however,	  
pervasively	  extracurricular.	  We	  were	  literally	  socialized	  into	  theory,	  through	  reading	  
groups	  and	  lectures.	  Elizabeth	  Clark	  presided	  over	  two	  monthly	  reading	  groups	  at	  which	  
she	  expected	  her	  students'	  regular	  attendance:	  a	  reading	  group	  in	  late	  antiquity	  (which	  has	  
since	  been	  absorbed	  into	  Duke's	  Center	  for	  Late	  Ancient	  Studies)	  and	  a	  reading	  group	  in	  
religion	  and	  theory	  that	  met	  along	  with	  faculty	  and	  students	  from	  nearby	  University	  of	  
North	  Carolina	  at	  Chapel	  Hill.	  Duke	  University	  in	  the	  1990s	  also	  drew	  what	  strikes	  me	  now	  
as	  an	  astounding	  list	  of	  guest	  lecturers	  (these	  were	  the	  days	  when	  Fred	  Jameson	  and	  
Stanley	  Fish	  still	  presided	  over	  the	  Departments	  of	  Literature	  and	  English,	  and	  the	  nearby	  
National	  Humanities	  Center	  then	  as	  now	  always	  drew	  remarkable	  talent):	  Gayatri	  Spivak,	  
Homi	  Bhabha,	  Robert	  Young,	  Ann	  McClintock	  and	  many	  more	  all	  drifted	  through	  and	  gave	  
talks	  in	  packed	  seminars	  and	  classrooms.	  Spivak	  was	  remarkably	  lucid,	  but	  no	  one	  asked	  
any	  questions;	  Bhabha	  kept	  interrupting	  himself,	  elongating	  a	  forty-­‐five	  minute	  talk	  into	  
something	  closer	  to	  two	  hours;	  Robert	  Young	  spoke	  personally	  and	  eloquently	  about	  
Derrida;	  and	  Ann	  McClintock	  showed	  fantastic	  pictures	  of	  Victorian	  advertisements	  and	  got	  
into	  a	  squabble	  with	  certain	  audience	  members	  about	  Judith	  Butler.	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   This	  theoretical	  atmosphere	  in	  which	  I	  found	  myself	  operated	  on	  certain	  
presuppositions	  (which	  I	  gradually	  learned	  to	  decode	  and	  articulate).	  One	  was	  
postmodernism:	  simply	  put,	  a	  rejection	  (or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  deep	  suspicion)	  of	  processes	  
of	  meaning-­‐making	  that	  aimed	  to	  uncover	  absolute	  or	  universal	  truths	  (or,	  as	  we	  put	  it,	  
"capital-­‐T	  truth");	  another	  was	  poststructuralism:	  simply	  put,	  again,	  a	  process	  of	  
decentering	  that	  called	  into	  question	  the	  "naturalness"	  of	  categories	  and	  linear	  explanatory	  
models.6	  From	  these	  two	  perspectives	  (which	  often	  became	  used	  interchangeably)	  we	  
engaged	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  theoretical	  postures:	  third-­‐wave	  feminism,	  queer	  theory,	  
Marxism	  (classical	  and	  cultural),	  sociology	  of	  knowledge,	  psychoanalytic	  theory,	  and,	  
naturally,	  streams	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  indebted	  to	  Foucault.7	  	  
	   I	  should	  note	  that,	  as	  I	  recall,	  the	  theoretically	  minded	  community	  of	  late	  antiquity	  
in	  central	  North	  Carolina	  saw	  our	  engagement	  with	  theory	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  broaden	  the	  
scope	  of	  our	  admittedly	  arcane	  fields	  of	  study.	  Theories	  had	  spread	  throughout	  particular	  
quarters	  of	  the	  humanities	  and	  social	  sciences	  in	  order	  to	  create	  analytic	  bridges	  between	  
otherwise	  disconnected	  quarters	  of	  academia.	  The	  historian	  of	  late	  ancient	  Christianity	  
could	  be	  in	  meaningful	  conversation	  with	  students	  of	  Italian	  literature,	  German	  art	  history,	  
Latin	  American	  politics,	  not	  to	  mention	  other	  vastly	  disparate	  realms	  of	  the	  far-­‐flung	  
discipline	  of	  religious	  studies.8	  Our	  works	  could	  influence	  each	  other,	  so	  that	  you	  might	  see	  
a	  theoretically	  informed	  work	  of	  Chinese	  medical	  history	  used	  to	  support	  an	  argument	  
about	  early	  Christian	  pneumatology,9	  or	  a	  study	  of	  early	  Christian	  asceticism	  brought	  to	  
bear	  on	  Victorian	  history	  or	  Thai	  Buddhism.10	  "Theory"	  was	  a	  common	  language	  we	  could	  
all	  speak,	  a	  kind	  of	  intellectual	  Esperanto,	  that	  could	  extend	  the	  breadth	  and	  reach	  of	  our	  
work.11	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   The	  use	  of	  theory	  also	  made	  certain	  political	  commitments	  more	  explicit	  and	  this	  
aspect,	  too,	  extended	  the	  implications	  of	  our	  work	  and	  brought	  our	  obscure	  objects	  of	  study	  
into	  wider	  conversations.	  It	  will	  not	  surprise	  you	  to	  learn	  that	  these	  were	  generally	  leftist	  
politics,	  postmodern	  extensions	  of	  the	  political	  commitments	  staked	  out	  by	  identity	  politics	  
in	  the	  previous	  decades.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  goals	  were	  the	  same:	  to	  decenter	  the	  
assumptions	  of	  a	  white,	  male,	  European	  project	  of	  knowledge	  creation	  (although,	  
somewhat	  ironically,	  through	  theoretical	  language	  devised	  by	  slightly	  later,	  often	  white,	  
often	  male	  Europeans).12	  Theory,	  as	  I	  learned	  to	  think	  through	  it	  in	  the	  1990s,	  was	  an	  
active	  project	  with	  (broadly)	  political	  aims.	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  idea	  was	  not	  to	  inject	  politics	  
into	  our	  historical	  scholarship;	  indeed,	  we	  assumed	  politics	  was	  always	  already	  present,	  
but	  masked	  under	  a	  cloak	  of	  objectivity.	  Theory	  laid	  those	  politics	  bare,	  and	  encouraged	  
new	  forms	  of	  politics.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  integration	  of	  poststructuralist	  theory	  into	  the	  study	  
of	  late	  antiquity	  posed	  a	  double	  challenge:	  not	  only	  to	  think	  differently	  about	  our	  objects	  of	  
study,	  but	  to	  think	  differently	  about	  how	  they	  had	  been	  studied	  in	  the	  past.13	  
	   Then	  as	  now,	  this	  theoretically	  inflected	  research	  into	  the	  past	  met	  some	  resistance.	  
Some	  of	  this	  resistance	  was	  theoretical	  and	  some	  was	  scholarly.	  On	  the	  theoretical	  side,	  
many	  of	  my	  fellow	  graduate	  students	  (particularly	  students	  of	  theology)	  resisted	  the	  
poststructuralist	  rejection	  of	  capital-­‐T	  Truth	  and	  developed	  sophisticated	  ways	  of	  keeping	  
the	  decentering	  methodologies	  of	  postmodernism	  while	  still	  advocating	  for	  constructive	  
orthodoxies.14	  On	  the	  scholarly	  side,	  to	  some	  the	  use	  of	  theory—particularly	  French,	  
poststructuralist	  theory—seemed	  fanciful,	  self-­‐indulgent,	  solipsistic,	  irrelevant,	  if	  not	  
downright	  inimical	  to	  "real"	  scholarship.	  The	  so-­‐called	  Sokal	  Hoax,	  perpetrated	  by	  physics	  
professor	  Alan	  Sokal	  on	  the	  (Duke-­‐based)	  journal	  Social	  Text,	  erupted	  precisely	  in	  my	  first	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years	  of	  graduate	  school,	  bringing	  home	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  suspicion	  even	  on	  the	  political	  
Left	  of	  the	  obscurantist	  and	  relativist	  world	  of	  "theory."15	  In	  my	  dissertation	  defense,	  I	  was	  
gently	  advised	  by	  some	  of	  my	  readers	  on	  how	  to	  make	  my	  study	  "more	  historical"	  
(presumably	  also	  "less	  theoretical").	  The	  assumption	  was,	  I	  think,	  that	  by	  forefronting	  my	  
theoretical	  goals	  and	  perspectives	  so	  much	  I	  had	  made	  my	  argument	  weaker,	  more	  about	  
theory	  than	  about	  history.	  	  
	   This	  historiographic	  resistance	  to	  theory	  was	  already	  a	  fairly	  broad	  topic	  of	  
conversation	  in	  early	  Christian	  studies	  during	  my	  graduate	  student	  days.	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Early	  Christian	  Studies,	  then	  still	  helmed	  by	  its	  founding	  editor	  Elizabeth	  Clark	  and	  housed	  
at	  Duke	  University,	  embodied	  this	  tension.	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  board	  (not	  least	  the	  
journal's	  editor)	  embraced	  theoretical	  approaches	  and	  saw	  the	  Journal	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
explore	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  Christian	  past.	  Other	  senior	  scholars	  on	  the	  board	  
found	  such	  theory-­‐driven	  research	  distracting	  and	  inappropriate,	  a	  predilection	  for	  
rhetorical	  ornamentation	  and	  "jargon"	  that	  obscured	  actual	  scholarship	  or—worse—was	  a	  
poor	  substitute	  for	  it.	  These	  scholars	  were	  also,	  undoubtedly,	  suspicious	  of	  what	  they	  
viewed	  as	  the	  particular	  leftist	  politics	  that	  seemed	  inherent	  in	  these	  theoretical	  studies.	  
The	  invocation	  of	  theory	  in	  patristics	  research	  became	  tantamount	  to	  choosing	  sides	  in	  a	  
clash	  of	  the	  titans.	  When	  I	  gave	  my	  very	  first	  conference	  paper,	  which	  attempted	  (probably	  
somewhat	  clumsily)	  to	  use	  Foucault's	  author	  function	  to	  trace	  shifts	  in	  Christian	  ideas	  of	  
"virtue,"	  a	  senior	  scholar	  complimented	  the	  general	  argument	  of	  my	  paper	  but	  asked	  
whether	  I	  "needed"	  the	  Foucault	  part.	  I	  bristled	  at	  the	  question:	  if	  I	  wouldn't	  have	  had	  the	  
idea	  to	  read	  these	  texts	  in	  this	  particular	  way	  without	  having	  read	  Foucault,	  shouldn't	  I	  cite	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him?	  Why	  should	  citing	  Foucault	  be	  different	  from	  citing	  any	  other	  modern	  author	  with	  
good	  ideas?	  
	   I	  have	  thought	  more	  abstractly	  about	  that	  question	  in	  the	  intervening	  years:	  did	  I	  
really	  "need"	  the	  Foucault	  part?	  What	  was	  I	  signaling	  by	  reading	  Foucault,	  using	  Foucault	  
as	  a	  lens	  to	  understand	  early	  Christian	  texts?	  Were	  my	  claims	  merely	  historical,	  or	  also	  
theoretical?	  Which	  came	  first	  for	  me:	  Foucault	  or	  the	  fathers?	  Was	  I	  deliberately	  infusing	  
politics	  into	  my	  scholarship—either	  a	  general	  leftist	  politics	  associated	  with	  French	  theory,	  
or	  a	  specific	  academic	  politics?	  I	  think,	  in	  retrospect,	  the	  well-­‐meaning	  dissertation	  readers	  
and	  the	  senior	  scholar	  at	  the	  conference	  were	  asking	  me	  to	  consider	  the	  same	  thing:	  what	  
do	  I	  want	  my	  scholarship	  to	  be	  about?	  What	  kind	  of	  historian	  was	  I?	  
	  
History	  
	   In	  her	  study	  of	  history	  and	  theory	  in	  2004,	  Elizabeth	  Clark	  surveyed	  the	  
philosophical	  problems	  of	  "straight"	  or	  untheorized	  history.	  Her	  point	  was,	  I	  think,	  twofold:	  
first,	  Clark	  was	  making	  a	  methodological	  argument	  about	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  Positivism	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	  century	  through	  the	  optimistic	  socioanthropological	  methodology	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  to	  the	  poststructural	  "linguistic	  turn"	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century;	  second,	  
she	  was	  elucidating	  a	  more	  fundamental	  throughline	  connecting	  these	  different	  moments:	  
that	  is,	  the	  moral	  core	  of	  the	  study	  of	  history.	  Clark	  summarizes	  these	  dual	  aspects	  of	  her	  
argument	  in	  her	  introduction	  when	  she	  writes:	  
I	  claim	  that	  such	  histories	  should	  acknowledge	  that,	  as	  intellectual	  constructions,	  
they	  differ	  from	  "the	  past,"	  vanished	  and	  now	  available	  only	  through	  "traces,"	  and	  
that	  no	  historical	  construction	  is	  "politically	  innocent"	  but	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  problems	  
and	  questions	  set	  by	  the	  historian	  in	  the	  present.16	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I	  want	  to	  linger	  on	  these	  two	  linked	  observations	  about	  history	  before	  turning	  back	  to	  my	  
own	  work	  (which	  is,	  in	  many	  ways,	  intertwined	  with	  Clark's).	  
	   To	  be	  sure,	  in	  most	  of	  History,	  Theory,	  Text	  Clark	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  first	  
problem:	  the	  "linguistic	  turn"	  in	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  that	  has	  called	  into	  question	  
precisely	  what	  we	  can	  learn	  from	  historical	  sources.	  No	  longer,	  Clark	  insists,	  can	  historians	  
blithely	  assume	  there	  is	  some	  recoverable	  "past"	  that	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  surviving	  
documents.	  (Clark	  is	  interested	  almost	  uniquely	  in	  written	  texts	  in	  this	  book.)	  It	  is	  a	  
problem	  of	  referentiality,	  she	  explains:	  we	  cannot	  assume	  any	  direct	  correspondence	  
between	  the	  discursively	  constructed	  texts	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  past	  "as	  it	  happened."	  
Language	  is	  not	  a	  semi-­‐translucent	  screen	  through	  which	  we	  might	  glimpse	  reality:	  it	  is	  the	  
only	  reality	  available	  to	  us,	  a	  material	  concatenation	  of	  linguistic	  units	  ultimately	  
constructed	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  present	  here	  and	  now.	  Historical	  texts,	  therefore,	  are	  not	  
strictly	  speaking	  "sources"	  but	  rather	  "traces."17	  	  
	   That	  word	  "traces"	  actually	  appears	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  times	  in	  History,	  Theory,	  
Text,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  other	  articles	  Clark	  wrote	  during	  this	  period.18	  It's	  an	  evocative	  term,	  
derived	  (for	  Clark)	  primarily	  from	  Jacques	  Derrida's	  notion	  of	  a	  text	  as	  constituting	  "traces"	  
of	  earlier	  texts,	  an	  intertextual	  chain	  that	  constantly	  re-­‐presents	  (but	  never	  directly	  refers	  
to)	  the	  past.19	  When	  Clark	  speaks	  of	  "traces"	  she	  wants	  to	  destabilize	  our	  idea	  of	  an	  
unmediated	  past,	  waiting	  to	  be	  rearticulated	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  our	  history.	  The	  past	  and	  
history	  are	  two	  different	  countries.	  We	  have	  only	  traces,	  and	  even	  those	  that	  seem	  to	  refer	  
to	  a	  recoverable	  past	  are	  really	  just	  echoes	  of	  other	  texts	  made	  up	  of	  even	  fainter	  echoes,	  
and	  so	  on.	  What	  we	  rebuild	  out	  of	  these	  traces	  cannot	  be	  "the	  past,"	  or	  even	  an	  accurate	  
facsimile	  of	  it.	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   Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  I	  think	  the	  term	  "traces"	  allows	  Clark	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  some	  of	  the	  
seduction	  of	  the	  real	  that	  animated	  Leopold	  von	  Ranke	  when	  he	  penetrated	  the	  archives	  in	  
the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  invented	  professional	  history.20	  The	  "real"	  past	  is	  a	  lure,	  a	  
mirage	  that	  tempts	  us.	  When	  we	  think	  of	  our	  documents	  as	  "traces"	  of	  that	  past,	  don't	  we	  
imagine	  that—on	  some	  level—even	  if	  we	  can't	  really	  reconstruct	  it—we	  are	  glimpsing	  it	  
vaguely	  on	  the	  horizon,	  like	  peaks	  of	  a	  far	  off	  mountain	  range?	  We	  will	  never	  reach	  those	  
mountains,	  never	  accurately	  map	  their	  contours,	  but	  does	  their	  dimly	  recognizable	  shape	  
nonetheless	  continue	  to	  energize	  and	  authorize	  our	  work?	  I	  don't	  think	  that	  Clark	  is	  a	  
crypto-­‐positivist,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  she	  sees	  attention	  to	  "representation"	  as	  opposed	  to	  
"reference"	  as	  a	  handy	  workaround,	  a	  shortcut	  through	  the	  linguistic	  turn	  back	  to	  "the	  
past."	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  something	  that	  the	  invocation	  of	  the	  past—even	  in	  "traces"—is	  
doing	  for	  us.	  
	   There	  is,	  I	  think,	  a	  kind	  of	  subtle	  and	  interesting	  connection	  back	  to	  the	  historical	  
Positivism	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  origins	  of	  modern,	  professional	  history.	  Not,	  as	  I	  say,	  in	  the	  idea	  
that	  we	  can	  accurately	  recover	  the	  past,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  our	  narratives	  of	  the	  past—
our	  histories—carry	  with	  them	  a	  unique	  moral	  authority.	  Despite	  his	  appropriation	  by	  U.S.	  
historians	  as	  the	  steely-­‐eyed	  progenitor	  of	  objective,	  scientific,	  positive	  history,	  von	  
Ranke's	  positivism	  had	  a	  broader,	  moral	  aspect	  to	  it.21	  For	  von	  Ranke,	  writing	  history	  was	  a	  
moral	  quest.	  The	  task	  of	  the	  historian	  was	  to	  elicit	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  past	  and	  reconstruct	  
its	  distinctive	  values,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  larger	  moral	  fabric	  of	  history.22	  The	  past	  
has	  a	  larger	  meaning	  that	  is	  elucidated	  by	  the	  work	  of	  the	  historian.	  Von	  Ranke's	  archival	  
precision	  stood	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  larger	  good.	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   The	  sense	  of	  the	  moral	  uses	  of	  the	  past	  in	  the	  present	  similarly	  energized	  ancient	  
historians	  in	  their	  "socioanthropological	  moment,"	  a	  reformation	  of	  "social	  history"	  
through	  social	  scientific	  methods	  and	  models	  in	  which	  Clark	  herself	  was	  quite	  prominent.23	  
The	  various	  liberatory	  goals	  of	  scholars	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  were	  deeply	  tied	  up	  in	  
their	  methodological	  strategies.	  Now,	  too,	  in	  a	  postmodern	  register,	  when	  Clark	  insists	  that	  
no	  historian	  can	  claim	  to	  be	  "politically	  innocent"	  she	  speaks	  to	  an	  analogous	  sense	  of	  the	  
moral	  urgency	  of	  historical	  work.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Clark's	  desire	  to	  make	  candid	  "the	  problems	  
and	  questions	  set	  by	  the	  historian	  in	  the	  present"	  differs	  a	  great	  deal	  from	  von	  Ranke's	  
certainty	  that	  our	  objective	  recovery	  of	  the	  past	  can	  effect	  moral	  change	  in	  the	  present.	  It	  
also	  moves	  us	  away-­‐-­‐epistemologically-­‐-­‐from	  the	  hopeful	  social	  history	  of	  Clark's	  own	  
earlier	  work.24	  Nonetheless,	  throughout	  the	  twists	  and	  turns	  of	  modern	  professional	  
history	  we	  find	  an	  ongoing	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  moral	  force	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  historian	  in	  wielding	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  expertise	  over	  the	  past.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  that	  moral	  force	  has	  always	  relied-­‐-­‐albeit	  in	  very	  different	  ways-­‐-­‐on	  
the	  traces	  of	  "the	  real"	  that	  linger	  from	  the	  past.	  Dominick	  LaCapra	  framed	  it	  clearly	  in	  his	  
2004	  work	  History	  In	  Transit	  (which	  Kim	  Haines-­‐Eitzen	  brought	  into	  conversation	  with	  
History,	  Theory,	  Text	  in	  a	  public	  response	  to	  Clark):	  "The	  'happening'	  of	  the	  past	  does	  not	  
exist	  only	  in	  the	  telling	  or	  the	  (historian's)	  text.	  If	  it	  did,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  referential	  
dimension	  to	  historiography.	  It	  would	  be	  self-­‐referential,	  formalistic	  fiction."25	  When	  Clark	  
refers	  time	  and	  again	  to	  the	  tantalizing	  "traces"	  of	  the	  past	  upon	  which	  professional	  
historians	  ply	  their	  trade,	  I	  think	  she	  is	  evoking	  this	  unique	  moral	  force,	  the	  seduction	  of	  
the	  "real"	  in	  the	  past	  that	  makes	  the	  narratives	  of	  professional	  historians	  more	  ethically	  
compelling	  than	  (say)	  the	  writings	  of	  historical	  novelists.	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   The	  connection	  between	  the	  allure	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  ethical	  obligations	  of	  the	  
historian	  have	  animated	  discussion	  and	  argument	  among	  professional	  historians,	  many	  of	  
whom	  would	  disagree	  with	  Clark's	  assertion	  that	  "no	  historical	  construction	  is	  'politically	  
innocent.'"26	  Some	  historians	  argue	  that	  our	  only	  ethical	  obligation	  is	  to	  get	  the	  past	  "right"	  
(or	  as	  close	  to	  "right"	  as	  our	  sources	  will	  allow)	  and	  any	  other	  political	  considerations	  
would	  actual	  hinder	  that	  ethical	  obligation.27	  Other	  historians	  argue	  that	  our	  ethical	  
obligations	  are	  to	  our	  historical	  subjects	  all	  of	  whom	  are,	  after	  all,	  dead	  and	  unable	  to	  speak	  
for	  themselves.	  Edith	  Wyschogrod	  articulates	  it	  clearly	  and	  compellingly:	  the	  ethical	  
obligations	  of	  the	  historian	  are	  an	  extension	  of	  every	  human	  agent's	  obligations	  to	  "the	  
other."28	  LaCapra,	  who	  has	  been	  writing	  about	  history	  and	  theory	  since	  the	  1980s,	  has	  in	  
recent	  years	  drawn	  the	  critical,	  ethical	  eye	  of	  historians	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  trauma,	  violence,	  
and	  the	  lost	  "experience"	  of	  the	  other.29	  All	  historians	  seems	  to	  agree	  that	  invocations	  of	  
the	  past—writing	  history—involve	  ethical	  stakes.	  Bad	  history	  refuses	  to	  take	  those	  ethical	  
stakes	  seriously.	  For	  positivist	  historians,	  bad	  history	  inflicts	  harm	  on	  the	  discipline	  and	  
those	  who	  seek	  knowledge	  of	  the	  past;	  for	  poststructuralist	  historians,	  bad	  history	  inflicts	  
harm	  on	  a	  multitude	  of	  "others,"	  alive	  and	  dead.	  
	  
Jewish-­‐Christian	  Relations,	  and	  Beyond	  
	   These	  are	  the	  many	  assumptions—realized	  and	  unrealized—that	  formed	  my	  
intellectual	  latticework	  when	  I	  was	  writing	  my	  dissertation,	  which	  became	  my	  first	  book:	  
history	  as	  a	  structured,	  ethical	  engagement	  with	  the	  past,	  and	  theory	  as	  the	  various	  
discourses	  available	  to	  me	  (as	  a	  historian)	  to	  facilitate	  those	  engagements.	  I	  wanted	  to	  
write	  good	  history,	  and	  good	  history	  makes	  responsible	  claims	  about	  the	  past	  in	  the	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present.	  Historians	  addressing	  the	  problem	  of	  Jewish-­‐Christian	  relations	  had	  attempted	  to	  
hold	  the	  traces	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  moral	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  historian	  in	  an	  unresolved	  
tension.	  If	  we	  took	  our	  sources	  seriously,	  we	  wrote	  an	  anti-­‐Jewish	  history	  (bad	  history	  in	  
our	  post-­‐Holocaust	  ethical	  context);	  if	  we	  dismissed	  our	  available	  sources,	  we	  were	  left	  
with	  no	  history	  whatsoever	  (bad	  history	  in	  our	  disciplinary	  context).	  The	  result	  in	  either	  
case	  as	  far	  as	  I	  could	  see	  was	  bad	  history	  because	  it	  refused	  to	  find	  positive	  ethical	  stakes	  in	  
the	  traces	  of	  the	  past.	  I	  don't	  mean	  that	  we	  had	  to	  redeem	  ancient	  Jews	  and	  Christians,	  
make	  them	  moral;	  I	  mean	  we	  had	  to	  secure	  a	  narrative	  past	  (that	  is,	  a	  history)	  that	  could	  
exert	  moral	  force	  in	  the	  present.	  Reifying	  historical	  Christian	  prejudice	  or	  dismissing	  it	  as	  
fantasy,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  was	  concerned,	  did	  not	  rise	  to	  this	  task.	  
	   But	  did	  my	  solution?	  I	  turned	  to	  postcolonial	  criticism	  precisely	  because	  it	  
acknowledges	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  past	  (to	  create	  a	  moral	  narrative	  we	  need	  to	  remember	  
that	  we	  are	  thinking	  about	  real	  people	  with	  real	  experiences)	  and	  the	  real	  force	  of	  language	  
in	  shaping	  people's	  lives.	  Christian	  writings	  about	  Jews	  were	  historical	  sources	  insofar	  as	  
they	  gave	  us	  insight	  into	  modes	  of	  representation	  and	  domination	  (and,	  I	  argued,	  the	  
possibility	  of	  Jewish	  resistance).	  The	  critical	  mode	  I	  chose	  was	  distinctly	  political:	  
postcolonial	  studies	  (as	  you	  might	  guess)	  tends	  to	  fall	  pretty	  clearly	  on	  the	  side	  against	  the	  
forces	  of	  empire,	  in	  the	  past	  and	  present.	  In	  this	  sense,	  those	  Christian	  writers	  I	  read	  
through	  the	  lens	  of	  colonialism	  were	  going	  to	  be,	  in	  some	  manner,	  the	  "bad	  guys"	  of	  my	  
story.30	  I	  don't	  think	  my	  first	  book	  was	  in	  any	  sense	  anti-­‐Christian;	  in	  fact,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  read	  my	  narrative	  as	  cautionary,	  what	  happens	  when	  religion	  and	  empire	  
intertwine	  (therefore	  holding	  out	  the	  hope	  of	  their	  disentwining).	  I	  was	  also	  deeply	  
concerned	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  representation:	  what	  kinds	  of	  worlds	  were	  (potentially)	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constructed	  by	  these	  early	  Christian	  texts,	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  possibilities	  did	  they	  hold	  out	  
for	  liberation?	  
	   Nonetheless,	  I	  realize	  as	  I	  look	  back	  that	  I	  chose	  a	  distinctly	  oppositional	  mode	  of	  
critical	  analysis	  in	  my	  first	  book,	  one	  which	  lends	  itself	  to	  "good	  guys"	  and	  "bad	  guys."	  The	  
analysis	  of	  colonialist	  rhetoric—besides	  being	  materialist,	  leftist,	  and	  attentive	  to	  rhetoric	  
without	  dismissing	  its	  experiential	  force—is	  also	  highly	  charged	  in	  its	  political	  implications.	  
In	  a	  roundtable	  among	  scholars	  of	  antiquity	  discussing	  postcolonial	  theory	  that	  took	  place	  
around	  the	  time	  my	  first	  book	  came	  out,	  another	  senior	  scholar	  pointed	  out	  to	  me	  (very	  
kindly)	  that	  my	  vision	  of	  antiquity,	  as	  it	  emerged	  through	  a	  postcolonial	  narrative,	  was	  
rather	  grim	  and	  chilling.	  Well,	  I	  responded,	  I	  imagine	  living	  as	  a	  materially	  colonized	  
subject	  in	  a	  violent,	  autocratic	  empire	  was	  rather	  grim	  and	  chilling.	  Of	  course,	  my	  
interlocutor	  knew	  this;	  what	  I	  was	  being	  asked,	  I	  think,	  was	  once	  more:	  why	  this	  approach?	  
Why	  did	  I	  choose	  to	  pursue	  a	  theorized	  narrative	  of	  the	  past	  that	  emphasized	  political	  
discord,	  cultural	  domination,	  and	  dimly	  imagined	  resistance?	  In	  that	  time	  and	  place	  in	  my	  
life,	  the	  most	  appealing	  and	  compelling	  ethical	  narrative	  I	  could	  weave	  out	  of	  the	  traces	  of	  
the	  past	  was	  a	  narrative	  of	  violence,	  power,	  and	  resistance.	  Those	  were	  the	  "problems	  and	  
questions"	  set	  by	  this	  historian	  in	  his	  present.	  I	  don't	  mean	  simply	  that	  I	  can	  explain	  my	  
book	  biographically,	  but	  rather	  that	  my	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  as	  a	  student	  of	  religion	  in	  
the	  late	  twentieth	  century	  was	  focused	  on	  particular	  problems.	  Our	  understanding	  of	  
Jewish-­‐Christian	  relations,	  as	  I	  perceived	  them,	  needed	  to	  be	  unsettled	  by	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  
power	  and	  resistance;	  likewise,	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  empire	  in	  religion	  
required	  some	  skeptical	  revisioning.	  My	  use	  of	  postcolonial	  criticism	  evoked	  a	  specific	  kind	  
of	  politics,	  and	  a	  specific	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  those	  politics.	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   When	  it	  came	  time	  to	  write	  my	  second	  book,	  on	  the	  circumcision	  of	  Christ,	  my	  
"problems	  and	  questions"	  were	  different.	  The	  problem	  I	  set	  was	  no	  longer	  one	  of	  power	  
and	  resistance	  but	  one	  of	  identity	  and	  difference.	  I	  identified	  another	  historiographic	  
"problem"	  of	  rhetoric:	  how	  do	  we	  square	  the	  insistent	  discourse	  of	  Christian	  unity	  with	  the	  
pervasive	  existence	  of	  Christian	  diversity	  in	  the	  first	  centuries	  of	  the	  religion?	  I	  pushed	  
deeper	  into	  the	  psychoanalytic	  roots	  of	  postcolonial	  criticism,	  retrieving	  theories	  of	  
personhood	  and	  community	  that	  described	  all	  boundaries	  as	  self-­‐undermining	  fantasies.	  If	  
the	  power	  structures	  of	  empire	  in	  my	  first	  book	  always	  necessarily	  invoked	  the	  resistance	  
of	  the	  powerless,	  now	  communal	  identity	  writ	  large	  resisted	  its	  own	  constitution.	  Pervasive	  
Christian	  rhetoric	  of	  boundaries	  and	  difference	  really	  dissolved	  boundaries	  and	  concealed	  
a	  longing	  for	  the	  other.	  As	  in	  my	  first	  book,	  I	  was	  very	  straightforward	  and	  clear	  about	  my	  
use	  of	  theory	  and	  why	  I	  thought	  it	  persuasively	  addressed	  the	  historical	  problem	  of	  
Christian	  difference	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  Lacan,	  Kristeva,	  and	  friends	  inhabited	  the	  main	  body	  of	  
my	  text,	  they	  did	  not	  just	  linger	  furtively	  in	  the	  endnotes.	  (And,	  as	  with	  my	  first	  book,	  some	  
immediate	  criticism	  from	  other	  scholars	  has	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  distracting	  and	  
"unnecessary"	  intrusion	  of	  theory	  into	  a	  historical	  analysis).	  Furthermore,	  I	  tied	  these	  
theoretical	  insights	  to	  a	  particular	  argument	  about	  the	  inner	  constitution	  of	  the	  Roman	  
Empire,	  and	  in	  this	  I	  claimed	  my	  argument	  was	  as	  historical	  as	  it	  was	  theoretical.	  By	  
historical	  I	  don't—I	  can't—mean	  that	  I	  have	  correctly	  decoded	  the	  capital-­‐T	  truth	  about	  the	  
Roman	  Empire	  and	  early	  Christianity.	  I	  mean	  that	  my	  use	  of	  the	  traces	  of	  the	  past	  form	  a	  
coherent	  and	  compelling	  ethical	  argument	  in	  our	  present	  moment.	  
	   But	  what	  do	  I	  mean	  by	  that?	  How	  do	  I	  (or	  how	  does	  another)	  judge	  the	  coherence	  of	  
my	  narrative	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  to	  whom—and	  for	  whom—is	  my	  ethical	  argument	  compelling?	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Here	  I	  think	  we	  get	  to	  some	  of	  the	  real	  problems	  (or,	  from	  another	  angle,	  the	  possibilities)	  
inherent	  in	  this	  particular	  theorized	  posture	  toward	  the	  writing	  of	  history.	  First,	  by	  what	  
measures	  do	  we	  evaluate	  postmodern	  history?	  How	  do	  I	  know	  my	  narrative	  is	  coherent?	  
There	  are,	  to	  be	  sure,	  certain	  rules	  of	  conduct	  in	  the	  writing	  of	  history,	  certain	  modes	  of	  
discourse	  that	  are	  allowable	  and	  not	  allowable:	  acceptable	  modes	  of	  handling,	  reproducing,	  
and	  connecting	  those	  "traces"	  of	  the	  past,	  linked	  to	  specific	  kinds	  of	  professional	  
expertise.31	  Texts	  must	  be	  placed	  in	  appropriate	  contexts;32	  appropriate	  linguistic	  expertise	  
of	  primary	  sources	  must	  be	  demonstrated;	  certain	  agreed	  upon	  facts	  must	  be	  respected	  
(dates,	  names,	  places,	  and	  so	  forth).	  Certain	  scholarly	  conventions—such	  as	  the	  footnote,	  
which	  I	  use	  in	  abundance—give	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  reliability	  of	  my	  particular	  historical	  
narrative	  (and	  locate	  me	  implicitly	  within	  particular	  scholarly	  networks).33	  If	  I	  follow	  these	  
rules	  and	  conventions	  (what	  my	  dissertation	  readers	  probably	  meant	  by	  making	  my	  work	  
"more	  historical")	  is	  my	  narrative	  thereby	  more	  historically	  coherent?	  	  
	   Perhaps,	  as	  intellectual	  historian	  Franklin	  Ankersmit	  has	  been	  arguing	  for	  some	  
time	  now,	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  we	  judge	  the	  relationship	  between	  history	  and	  the	  past	  are	  
primarily	  aesthetic	  (and	  therefore	  subjective	  and	  contingent),	  more	  analogous	  to	  artistic	  
representation	  than	  to	  scientific	  proof.34	  We	  are	  not	  interpreting	  the	  traces	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  
rather	  depicting	  them.	  The	  criterion	  for	  evaluation	  is	  not,	  therefore,	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
interpretation	  but	  the	  resonance	  of	  my	  depiction.	  Whether	  or	  not	  readers	  find	  my	  depiction	  
coherent	  might	  be	  judged	  by	  how	  well—how	  "realistically,"	  perhaps—I	  have	  rendered	  my	  
subject.35	  If	  such	  historiographic	  judgments	  are	  conventional	  (or,	  to	  be	  more	  blunt,	  
subjective)	  then	  it	  becomes	  clear	  (to	  me,	  at	  least)	  that	  we	  cannot	  disentangle	  questions	  of	  
historical	  coherence	  from	  ethical	  value.	  Subjective	  judgment	  entails	  moral	  judgment.	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History	  seems	  right—or	  accurate,	  or	  faithful	  to	  the	  traces	  of	  the	  past—when	  it	  also	  does	  
notable	  and	  effective	  work	  in	  the	  present.	  Good	  history	  is	  good	  history.	  
	   Untangling	  the	  relationship	  between	  historicity	  and	  ethics	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  
ghost	  of	  the	  real	  that	  underlies	  our	  fascination	  with	  the	  past:	  those	  elusive	  traces	  which	  
escape	  our	  grasp	  but	  nonetheless	  give	  moral	  force	  to	  our	  historical	  narratives.	  For	  my	  
history	  to	  be	  compelling	  and	  coherent,	  it	  must	  evoke	  that	  past	  in	  a	  way	  that	  seems	  real	  
enough,	  even	  as	  I	  disavow	  any	  attempt	  to	  fully	  resurrect	  and	  re-­‐present	  "the	  real."	  "The	  
past"	  must	  still,	  in	  some	  persuasive	  and	  demonstrable	  way,	  lie	  behind	  my	  narrative	  and	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  I	  make	  clear	  that	  dependence	  becomes	  one	  measure	  by	  which	  other	  
historians	  may	  gauge	  my	  "coherence."	  	  
	   By	  giving	  up	  on	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  still	  drawing	  on	  its	  moral	  force	  to	  
advance	  ethically	  compelling	  narratives,	  I	  may	  seem	  to	  some	  historians	  to	  be	  trying	  to	  have	  
my	  cake	  and	  eat	  it,	  too.	  Here,	  at	  last,	  is	  where	  I	  think	  the	  presence	  of	  theory	  becomes	  
critically	  significant	  in	  my	  history	  writing.	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  me	  to	  simply	  know	  that	  
when	  I	  write	  history	  I	  am	  not	  making	  present	  the	  past,	  but	  rather	  marshaling	  traces	  of	  "the	  
past"	  to	  craft	  significant	  narratives	  in	  the	  present.	  I	  must	  also	  explain	  to	  my	  readers	  what	  
questions	  and	  concerns	  motivate	  my	  historical	  writing:	  what	  is	  "the	  present"	  from	  which	  I	  
am	  narrating	  "the	  past,"	  and	  how	  do	  those	  present	  circumstance	  help	  determine	  my	  mode	  
of	  historical	  operation?36	  Theory	  helps	  me	  make	  those	  claims.	  If	  I	  do	  not	  make	  my	  stakes	  
clear	  through	  my	  theoretical	  framework,	  I	  am	  indeed	  engaging	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  sleight-­‐of-­‐hand,	  
veiling	  contemporary	  concerns	  under	  the	  cloak	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  historiographic	  "realism."	  
Theory	  pulls	  back	  the	  veil,	  without	  disavowing	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  "real"	  history	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  historical	  fiction).	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   The	  presence	  of	  theory	  in	  my	  historical	  writing—in	  addition	  to	  (hopefully)	  making	  
my	  historical	  narratives	  accessible	  across	  academic	  disciplines—therefore	  also	  makes	  
explicit	  how	  and	  why	  I	  am	  using	  traces	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  therefore	  renders	  both	  my	  
historical	  representation	  and	  its	  ethical	  force	  open	  to	  useful	  critique	  and	  revision.	  When	  I	  
use	  postcolonial	  "theory"	  in	  my	  first	  book,	  I	  am	  framing	  the	  problem	  of	  Jewish-­‐Christian	  
relations	  as	  primarily	  a	  political	  problem,	  a	  problem	  of	  representation,	  domination,	  and	  
resistance.	  Christian	  sources	  about	  Jews	  from	  the	  holy	  land	  are	  brought	  to	  bear	  in	  this	  
narrative	  neither	  as	  reliable	  witnesses	  nor	  as	  airless	  fantasies,	  but	  as	  species	  of	  a	  particular	  
kind	  of	  materialist	  speech	  that	  brings	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  world	  to	  life.	  That	  world,	  as	  it	  
emerges	  in	  my	  book,	  challenges	  us	  to	  think	  in	  new	  ways	  about	  the	  appropriation	  of	  other	  
space,	  the	  monumentalization	  of	  religious	  triumphalism,	  and	  the	  relation	  between	  
knowledge	  production	  and	  political	  will.	  Ten	  years	  later,	  I	  think	  these	  remain	  pressing	  
questions	  for	  us	  to	  ponder.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  ties	  my	  narrative	  tightly	  to	  its	  moral	  
framework;	  my	  argument	  is	  at	  once	  about	  how	  to	  rearrange	  our	  "traces"	  into	  a	  coherent	  
(perhaps,	  "realistic")	  narrative	  and	  also	  about	  the	  larger	  significance	  of	  that	  narrative.	  To	  
engage	  with	  my	  argument	  and	  critique	  it,	  therefore,	  I	  think	  it's	  probably	  not	  sufficient	  to	  
say	  that	  my	  use	  of	  theory	  renders	  my	  use	  of	  historical	  sources	  problematic.	  Theory	  links	  
my	  historical	  work	  to	  my	  ethical	  hopes.	  Historiographic	  coherence	  and	  ethical	  viability	  can	  
thus	  be	  judged	  together,	  allowing	  my	  readers	  to	  judge	  fairly	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  result	  is,	  in	  
the	  end,	  good	  history.	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1	  My	  thoughts	  on	  this	  subject	  appeared	  in	  two	  places	  in	  2003:	  first,	  in	  an	  extended	  essay	  
"The	  Lion	  and	  the	  Lamb:	  Reconsidering	  Jewish-­‐Christian	  Relations	  in	  Antiquity,"	  in	  The	  
Ways	  that	  Never	  Parted:	  Jews	  and	  Christians	  in	  Late	  Antiquity	  and	  the	  Early	  Middle	  Ages,	  
ed.	  Annette	  Yoshiko	  Reed	  and	  Adam	  Becker	  (Tübingen:	  Mohr	  Siebeck,	  2003),	  95-­‐118;	  and	  
as	  the	  concluding	  chapter	  of	  Remains	  of	  the	  Jews:	  The	  Holy	  Land	  and	  Christian	  Empire	  in	  
Late	  Antiquity	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  200-­‐209.	  I	  rehearsed	  the	  
arguments	  of	  these	  pieces	  in	  a	  broader	  framework	  in	  "Jews	  and	  Christians,"	  in	  The	  Oxford	  
Handbook	  of	  Early	  Christian	  Studies,	  ed.	  Susan	  Ashbrook	  Harvey	  and	  David	  G.	  Hunter	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  169-­‐85.	  	  
2	  Jacobs,	  "Lion	  and	  the	  Lamb,"	  106-­‐7;	  see	  also	  Remains	  of	  the	  Jews,	  7-­‐10.	  	  
3	  See	  my	  discussion	  in	  Remains	  of	  the	  Jews,	  10,	  where	  I	  note	  (briefly)	  Robert	  Young's	  
insistence	  on	  the	  modernist	  context	  of	  postcolonial	  criticism	  (Postcolonialism:	  An	  
Historical	  Introduction	  [London:	  Blackwell,	  2001]),	  56).	  	  
4	  Elizabeth	  A.	  Clark,	  The	  Origenist	  Controversy:	  The	  Cultural	  Construction	  of	  a	  Christian	  
Debate	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  1:	  "To	  other	  readers,	  my	  rendition	  of	  
the	  controversy's	  issues	  will	  carry	  contemporary	  resonance:	  the	  status	  of	  representation;	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  body	  is	  inscribed	  with	  cultural	  value;	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  'self';	  
how	  praxis	  both	  creates	  and	  challenges	  theory."	  
5	  This	  policy	  still	  stands	  (personal	  communication	  from	  Maria	  Doerfler,	  February	  19,	  2013).	  
6	  Both	  of	  these	  perspectives	  are	  evident	  in	  Elizabeth	  Clark's	  definitions	  of	  "theory"	  in	  
History,	  Theory,	  Text:	  Historians	  and	  the	  Linguistic	  Turn	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  2004),	  x:	  first,	  from	  Rey	  Chow,	  "the	  paradigm	  shift	  introduced	  by	  post-­‐structuralism,	  
whereby	  the	  study	  of	  language,	  literature,	  and	  cultural	  forms	  becomes	  irrevocably	  obliged	  
to	  attend	  to	  the	  semiotic	  operations	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  meanings,	  meanings	  that	  
can	  no	  longer	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  natural"	  (see	  Chow,	  "The	  Interruption	  of	  Referentiality,"	  
South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  101	  [2002]:	  172);	  second,	  from	  Paul	  Strohm,	  "any	  standpoint	  from	  
which	  we	  might	  challenge	  a	  text's	  self-­‐understanding"	  (see	  Strohm,	  "Introduction,"	  Theory	  
and	  the	  Premodern	  Text	  [Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota,	  2000],	  xiv).	  
7	  These	  poststructuralist	  and	  postmodernist	  perspectives	  had	  dislodged	  earlier	  prominent	  
social	  scientific	  modes	  of	  analysis	  at	  Duke	  in	  the	  1980s,	  perhaps	  most	  significantly	  the	  
aspiration	  to	  reproduce	  the	  "thick	  description"	  of	  Geertzian	  anthropological	  writing:	  see	  
Clark,	  History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  145-­‐55.	  
8	  Elizabeth	  Clark	  affirms	  this	  recollection	  in	  "Response	  to	  Comments	  on	  History,	  Theory,	  
Text,"	  Church	  History	  74	  (2005):	  831:	  "At	  Duke	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  
colleagues	  in	  Literature	  or	  French	  were	  not	  interested	  in	  antiquity;	  if	  professors	  of	  early	  
Christianity	  wished	  to	  engage	  them	  in	  conversation,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  grasp	  the	  
rudiments	  of	  their	  language."	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9	  So	  Dale	  Martin,	  The	  Corinthian	  Body	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  142-­‐45.	  
10	  Peter	  Brown's	  The	  Body	  and	  Society:	  Men,	  Women,	  and	  Sexual	  Renunciation	  in	  Early	  
Christianity	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  is	  routinely	  cited	  as	  a	  
theoretically	  significant	  text	  along	  with	  Foucault's	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  and	  Thomas	  
Laqueur's	  Making	  Sex.	  
11	  Dominick	  LaCapra,	  History	  in	  Transit:	  Experience,	  Identity,	  Critical	  Theory	  (Ithaca:	  
Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  249-­‐53,	  refers	  somewhat	  disparagingly	  to	  the	  
"import/export"	  model	  by	  which	  historians	  took	  in	  social	  scientific	  methods	  in	  order	  to	  
craft	  more	  persuasive	  and	  self-­‐reflexive	  narratives.	  
12	  Although	  French	  structuralism	  and	  poststructuralism	  was	  deeply	  marked	  by	  feminist	  
criticism	  as	  well	  as	  the	  colonial	  and	  postcolonial	  struggles	  of	  French	  North	  Africa:	  see	  Pal	  
Ahluwalia,	  Out	  of	  Africa:	  Post-­‐Structuralism's	  Colonial	  Roots	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2010)	  
13	  Perhaps	  unsurprisingly	  my	  two	  theoretical	  mentors	  eventually,	  in	  different	  ways,	  ended	  
up	  turning	  their	  historical	  critical	  gaze	  from	  antiquity	  to	  the	  study	  of	  antiquity:	  see	  Dale	  B.	  
Martin,	  "Paul	  and	  the	  Judaism/Hellenism	  Dichotomy:	  A	  Social	  History	  of	  the	  Question,"	  in	  
Paul	  Beyond	  the	  Judaism/Hellenism	  Divide,	  ed.	  Troels	  Engberg-­‐Pedersen	  (Louisville:	  
Westminster/John	  Knox,	  2001),	  29-­‐61	  and	  (more	  extensively),	  Elizabeth	  A.	  Clark,	  Founding	  
the	  Fathers:	  Early	  Church	  History	  and	  Protestant	  Professors	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  
America,	  Divinations	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2011).	  
14	  The	  rising	  tides	  of	  "Radical	  Orthodoxy"	  became	  quite	  popular	  among	  the	  theoretically	  
sophisticated	  theology	  students	  coming	  out	  of	  Duke	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
15	  In	  1996,	  Alan	  Sokal	  submitted	  a	  deliberately	  "incoherent"	  poststructuralist	  article	  on	  
quantum	  gravity	  accepted	  to	  the	  critical	  theory	  journal	  Social	  Text,	  which	  was	  accepted	  
("Transgressing	  the	  Boundaries:	  Towards	  a	  Transformative	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Quantum	  
Gravity,"	  Social	  Text	  46/47	  [1996]:	  217-­‐252);	  he	  simultaneously	  published	  an	  account	  of	  
his	  hoax	  in	  the	  theory-­‐suspicious	  neoliberal	  academic	  "trade"	  journal	  Lingua	  Franca	  ("A	  
Physicist	  Experiments	  With	  Cultural	  Studies,"	  Lingua	  Franca	  [May	  1996]:	  62-­‐64).	  His	  
purpose,	  as	  he	  explained	  there,	  was	  to	  unmask	  the	  lack	  of	  academic	  rigor	  masked	  by	  
poststructuralist	  jargon.	  The	  editors	  of	  Lingua	  Franca	  subsequently	  published	  a	  collection	  
including	  Sokal's	  two	  original	  articles	  and	  responses:	  The	  Sokal	  Hoax:	  The	  Sham	  That	  
Shook	  the	  Academy	  (Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	  2000).	  (It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  
Lingua	  Franca	  has	  since	  shut	  down,	  while	  Social	  Text	  still	  publishes.)	  Sokal	  himself	  still	  
dines	  out	  on	  his	  somewhat	  mean-­‐spirited	  notoriety:	  see	  Alan	  Sokal,	  Beyond	  the	  Hoax:	  
Science,	  Philosophy,	  and	  Culture	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  	  
16	  Clark,	  History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  7.	  
17	  As	  Richard	  Lim	  ("Conversion	  or	  Adhesion?	  Historians	  between	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  and	  
the	  Linguistic	  Turn")	  points	  out	  in	  his	  response	  to	  Clark's	  book,	  published	  as	  part	  of	  a	  set	  in	  
Church	  History	  74	  (2005):	  820-­‐26,	  as	  very	  few	  scholars	  of	  antiquity	  professed	  to	  be	  pure	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Rankean	  historians	  toiling	  in	  the	  archives	  in	  quest	  of	  truth,	  her	  main	  targets	  for	  correction	  
are	  in	  fact	  social	  historians	  enthralled	  "sociocultural"	  approaches:	  "Annales,	  microhistory,	  
Geertzian	  'thick	  description,'	  and	  Marxist	  'history	  from	  below,'	  all	  of	  which	  presuppose	  that	  
the	  historians'	  task	  is	  to	  uncover	  and	  understand	  a	  substratum	  of	  realia	  through	  critical	  
analysis"	  (821).	  
18	  Clark,	  History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  x,	  7,	  18,	  72,	  102,	  120,	  123,	  128,	  129,	  132,	  152,	  157,	  286n13,	  
297n148;	  see	  also	  Clark,	  "The	  Lady	  Vanishes:	  Dilemmas	  of	  a	  Feminist	  Historian	  after	  the	  
'Linguistic	  Turn,'"	  Church	  History	  67	  (1998):	  31;	  Clark,	  "Holy	  Women,	  Holy	  Words:	  Early	  
Christian	  Women,	  Social	  History,	  and	  the	  'Linguistic	  Turn,'"	  Journal	  of	  Early	  Christian	  
Studies	  6	  (1998):	  420,	  429.	  
19	  Clark,	  History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  152	  (for	  instance).	  Clark	  also	  refers	  to	  Hayden	  White's	  post-­‐
Metahistory	  incorporation	  of	  some	  poststructuralist	  (even	  Derridean)	  ideas:	  "Although	  
inaccessible	  to	  us,	  past	  events,	  [White]	  claimed,	  leave	  their	  'traces'	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
documents,	  monuments,	  and	  in	  present	  social	  practices"	  (History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  102).	  
20	  On	  von	  Ranke,	  see	  Clark,	  History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  9-­‐13;	  Clark	  is	  most	  interested	  in	  the	  
American	  appropriation	  of	  von	  Ranke's	  famous	  quest	  for	  the	  past	  "wie	  es	  eigentlich	  
gewesen"	  into	  an	  "objective"	  historical	  science	  (see	  pp.	  13-­‐17),	  which	  (she	  acknowledges)	  
stripped	  von	  Ranke's	  Positivism	  of	  its	  moral	  fervor	  (on	  which	  see	  below).	  
21	  Clark,	  History,	  Theory,	  Text,	  13;	  as	  per	  usual	  with	  Clark,	  a	  reader	  must	  also	  consult	  the	  
voluminous	  footnotes	  to	  these	  few	  sentences	  on	  pp.	  202-­‐3.	  
22	  See	  the	  extensive	  introduction	  and	  collection	  of	  von	  Ranke's	  writings	  in	  Leopold	  von	  
Ranke,	  The	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  of	  History,	  2d	  ed.,	  ed.	  Georg	  G.	  Iggers	  (London:	  Routledge,	  
2011).	  
23	  For	  Lim,	  "Conversion	  or	  Adhesion,"	  Clark's	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  possibilities	  of	  social	  
history	  forms	  the	  center	  of	  his	  critique,	  as	  he	  asks:	  "Should	  we	  read	  in	  HTTHLT	  [History,	  
Theory,	  Text:	  Historians	  and	  the	  Linguistic	  Turn]	  a	  call	  for	  a	  moratorium	  on	  a	  seemingly	  
fruitful	  scholarly	  approach	  that	  Prof.	  Clark's	  own	  work	  has	  done	  so	  much	  to	  propagate?"	  
(822).	  
24	  Clark	  discusses	  the	  struggle	  with	  her	  own,	  earlier	  social	  historical	  work-­‐-­‐explicitly	  
prompted	  by	  her	  feminist	  historical	  concerns-­‐-­‐in	  "The	  Lady	  Vanishes."	  	  
25	  LaCapra,	  History	  in	  Transit,	  29;	  see	  Kim	  Haines-­‐Eitzen,	  "Reimagining	  Patristics:	  Theory's	  
Vital	  Role	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Premodern	  Texts,"	  Church	  History	  74	  (2005):	  816-­‐20.	  
26	  In	  the	  same	  year	  that	  Clark's	  History,	  Theory,	  Text	  was	  published	  appeared	  the	  collection	  
of	  essays	  in	  The	  Ethics	  of	  History,	  Northwestern	  Topics	  in	  Historical	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  David	  
Carr,	  Thomas	  Flynn,	  and	  Rudolf	  Makkreel	  (Evanston:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
This	  collection	  was	  based	  on	  a	  conference	  held	  at	  Emory	  University	  in	  1998.	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27	  So	  Allan	  Megill,	  "Some	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Ethics	  of	  History-­‐Writing:	  Reflections	  on	  Edith	  
Wyschogrod's	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Remembering,"	  in	  Carr	  et	  al.,	  Ethics	  of	  History,	  45-­‐75,	  at	  (for	  
instance)	  49:	  "Fundamentally,	  before	  anything	  else,	  the	  historian	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  vouch	  
for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  history	  that	  he	  or	  she	  writes,	  just	  as	  the	  accountant	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
vouch	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  accounts	  that	  he	  or	  she	  presents."	  Later,	  Megill	  notes	  that:	  "the	  
historian	  stands	  apart	  from	  the	  notion	  that	  history	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  form	  of	  propaganda	  for	  
'the	  good	  cause'—whatever	  that	  cause	  may	  be—and	  instead	  engages	  in	  a	  pursuit	  that	  
stands	  beyond	  such	  particular	  commitments"	  (55-­‐56).	  
28	  Edith	  Wyschogrod,	  "Representation,	  Narrative,	  and	  the	  Historian's	  Promise,"	  in	  Carr	  et	  
al.,	  Ethics	  of	  History,	  28-­‐44,	  drawing	  on	  her	  earlier	  work	  in	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Remembering:	  
History,	  Heterology,	  and	  the	  Nameless	  Others,	  Religion	  and	  Postmodernism	  (Chicago:	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998).	  Wyschogrod's	  emphasis	  on	  historical	  ethics	  and	  the	  
"other"	  (heteros)	  recalls	  Michel	  de	  Certeau,	  Heterologies:	  Discourse	  on	  the	  Other	  
(Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1986).	  
29	  Dominick	  LaCapra,	  Representing	  the	  Holocaust:	  History,	  Theory,	  Trauma	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  1996);	  History	  and	  Memory	  After	  Auschwitz	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  
Press,	  1998);	  Writing	  History,	  Writing	  Trauma	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  
Press,	  2001);	  History	  in	  Transit;	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